Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Governmental structures: Governmental structures are the systems and processes by which governments are organized and operate. They include the distribution of power between different branches of government, the roles and responsibilities of different government officials, and the ways in which citizens participate in government. See also State, Society, Community._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Guido E. Tabellini on Governmental Structures - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 208 Governmental structures/Persson/Tabellini/Voigt: Many scholars argue that the degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary systems, as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. For example, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997(1), 2000(2)) point out that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect more corruption and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000)(2) predict that both taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems. To test their hypotheses, Persson and Tabellini (2003)(3) needed to code presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. In the absence of a vote of no confidence they coded the country as presidential. They derive the following results. (1) Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems. (2) The size of the welfare state is some 2-3% lower in presidential systems. (3) The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget deficits. (4) Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. (5) There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency between the two forms of government. (6) Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this result is significant at the 10% level only. VsTabellini/VsPersson: In a study replicating and extending the PT (= Persson/Tabellini) estimates, Blume et al. (2009a)(4) pour some water into PT's wine. It turns out that PT's results are not robust, even to minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from eighty to ninety-two makes the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of presidentialism is used. >Electory Systems/Tabellini/Persson, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (1997). "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 12: 310-327. 2. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1121-1161. 3. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Tabellini
> Counter arguments in relation to Governmental Structures
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27